…the prospect of a successful coup in the DRC is inconceivable, as it would exacerbate the country’s insecurity and further destabilise the region. African peace, security, and democratic stakeholders must remain vigilant with regard to any ‘breaking news’ of attempted or successful military coups on the continent.
In the early hours of 19 May, heavily armed men attacked the presidency of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the city centre, Kinshasa. Another incident occurred at the nearby residence of Vital Kamerhe, a parliament member who is a leading candidate for the position of speaker. Based on a report by the spokesperson for the Central African country’s army, General Sylvain Ekenge, the coup leader was killed, and 50 people, including British and Americans, were arrested. Christian Malanga, a US-based Congolese politician (who has acquired American citizenship), previously accused of attempting to overthrow the government in 2017, has been allegedly identified as the leader of this attempted coup.
While no definite reasons have been attributed for the ‘attempted coup,’ there are insinuations that it could be related to the internal political crisis, particularly the decision of President Tshisekedi to postpone a parliamentary leadership election scheduled for Saturday, 18 May. As anticipated, the international community condemned the reports, including the African Union Commission (AUC), the leadership of the United Nations stabilisation mission in the DRC, and the United States, represented by its ambassador to the DRC, Lucy Tamlyn.
Incidentally, the news of the attempted coup filtered into the public space three days after an edited volume titled, The Resurgence of Military Coups and Democratic Relapse in Africa, was published. The 10-chapter book, edited by Adeoye O. Akinola, links military coups and bad governance and locates unconstitutional changes in government in historical and contemporary contexts. Since August 2020, African countries have experienced eight successful military coups. The military struck in Mali on two occasions – 18 August 2020 and 24 May 2021; in Guinea on 5 September 2021; and in Sudan on 25 October 2021. There were two putsches on 24 January and 30 September 2022 in Burkina Faso; on 26 July 2023 in Niger; and on 30 August 2023 in Gabon. The blatant disregard for democratic institutions on the continent is appalling and shocking. As seen in the Sahel region of Africa, the audacity to assault the stewards of political authority and desecrate prevailing democratic structures underscores the profound failure of the promises of democracy in Africa.
Despite numerous regional and continental protocols designed to prevent military incursions into politics and unconstitutional changes of government, the military have often managed to circumvent these measures and maintain power in affected countries. It is evident that regional and continental actors lack effective strategies to compel the military to return to the barracks.
While it is important to label a ‘coup’ as such accurately, the situation in the DRC demands careful consideration. As the world awaits further information regarding the ‘attempted coup’, the term ‘military coup’ should be used cautiously. According to statements from the military spokesman, this was an orchestrated attack by foreign fighters, commonly referred to as mercenaries, with no involvement from Congolese military personnel. If the information concerning the ‘attempted coup’ by the DRC military spokesperson proves accurate, three critical questions arise: Will Africa begin to reflect more seriously on the externalisation of its security and the growing influence of mercenaries on the continent? Can this truly be considered a military coup? Should we start to broaden the definition and understanding of military coups? Ruth First, a renowned scholar on military coups, asserts that such actions typically involve elements of the political system and they have the support of some members of the security forces. Most literature on military coups emphasises the illegal removal of a government through excessive or moderate force or the threat thereof. However, anything is possible in Africa.
Thus, the prospect of a successful coup in the DRC is inconceivable, as it would exacerbate the country’s insecurity and further destabilise the region. African peace, security, and democratic stakeholders must remain vigilant with regard to any ‘breaking news’ of attempted or successful military coups on the continent. Despite numerous regional and continental protocols designed to prevent military incursions into politics and unconstitutional changes of government, the military have often managed to circumvent these measures and maintain power in affected countries. It is evident that regional and continental actors lack effective strategies to compel the military to return to the barracks. Immediately after the coup in Niger, the dismissal of the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) threats to ‘order’ the military regime to immediately restore the civilian President Mohamed Bazoum to power was a monumental diplomatic calamity.
The branding of the assailants as ‘foreigners’ and accusing of external powers as orchestrating the ‘attempted coup’ aligns with the prevailing narrative of external influences shaping Africa’s political and security landscapes; however, it is implausible that such attacks could transpire without internal collusion.
Furthermore, civil society groups in some of these countries find themselves in unfamiliar territory, as segments of the population celebrate the overthrow of democratic governments – a few of which had actually become illegitimate. The military regimes in the Sahel region have further solidified their ‘illegal’ grip on power by adeptly incorporating anti-Western and Pan-African rhetoric into their narratives.
The branding of the assailants as ‘foreigners’ and accusing of external powers as orchestrating the ‘attempted coup’ aligns with the prevailing narrative of external influences shaping Africa’s political and security landscapes; however, it is implausible that such attacks could transpire without internal collusion. Consequently, the Congolese government must scrutinise its own security apparatus to prevent a recurrence. It is also hoped that in doing so, the government will not exploit this opportunity to persecute its ‘enemies’ within the political and security terrain.
Adeoye O. Akinola is Head of Research and Teaching at the Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPATC) and Institute for Global African Affairs (IGAA), University of Johannesburg.
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