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In the past week, AT&T has announced an absolutely massive data breach. This is sort of a multi-layered story, but it gives me an opportunity to use my favorite piece of snarky IT commentary: The cloud is a fancy way to talk about someone else’s servers. And when that provider has a security problem, chances are, so do you.

The provider in question is Snowflake, who first made the news in the Ticketmaster breach. As far as anyone can tell, Snowflake has not actually been directly breached, though it seems that researchers at Hudson Rock briefly reported otherwise. That post has not only been taken down, but also scrubbed from the wayback machine, apparently in response to a legal threat from Snowflake. Ironically, Snowflake has confirmed that one of their former employees was compromised, but Snowflake is certain that nothing sensitive was available from the compromised account.

At this point, it seems that the twin problems are that big organizations aren’t properly enforcing security policy like Two Factor Authentication, and Snowflake just doesn’t provide the tools to set effective security policy. The Mandiant report indicates that all the breaches were the result of credential stealers and other credential-based techniques like credential stuffing.

Cisco’s Easy Password Reset

Cisco has patched a vulnerability in the Smart Software Manager On-Prem utility, a tool that allows a business to manage their own Cisco licenses. The flaw was a pretty nasty one, where any user could change the password of any other user.

While there are no workarounds, an update with the fix has been released for free. As [Dan Goodin] at Ars speculates, full administrative access to this management console could provide unintended access to all the rest of the Cisco gear in a given organization. This seems like one to get patched right away.

Bye Bye Kaspersky

Kaspersky Labs has officially started started winding down their US operations, as a direct result of the US Commerce Department ban. As a parting gift, anyone who wants it gets a free six-month subscription.

Just a reminder, any Kaspersky installs will stop getting updates at that six-month mark, so don’t forget to go on a Kaspersky uninstall spree at that time. We’ve got the twin dangers, that the out-of-date antivirus could prevent another solution like Windows Defender from running, and that security products without updates are a tempting target for escalation of privilege attacks.

Uncoordinated Vulnerability Disclosure

Let’s chat a bit about coordinated vulnerability disclosure. That’s the process when a researcher finds a vulnerability, privately reports it to the vendor, and together they pick a date to make the details public, usually somewhere around 90 or 120 days from disclosure. The researcher gets credit for the find, sometimes a bug bounty payout, and the vendor fixes their bug.

Things were not always this way. Certain vendors were once well known for ignoring these reports for multiple months at a time, only to rush out a fix if the bug was exploited in the wild. This slapdash habit led directly to our current 90-day industry standard. And in turn, a strict 90-day policy is usually enough to provoke responsible behaviors from vendors.

Usually, but not always. ZDI discovered the Internet Explorer technique that we discussed last week being used in the wild. Apparently [Haifei Li] at Check Point Research independently discovered the vulnerability, and it’s unclear which group actually reported it first. What is clear is that Microsoft dropped the ball on the patch, surprising both research teams and failing to credit the ZDI researcher at all. And as the ZDI post states, this isn’t an isolated incident:

While these are Microsoft examples, there are multiple occasions from various vendors where “coordination” simply means “You tell us everything you know about this bug, and maybe something will happen.”

Bits and Bytes

Claroty’s Team82 has documented their rather impressive entry in the 2023 Pwn2Own IoT contest. The two part series starts with a WAN side attack, targeting a router’s dynamic DNS. We briefly discussed that last week. This week is the juicy details of an unauthenticated buffer overflow, leading to RCE on the device. This demonstrates the clever and terrifying trick of attacking a network from the Internet and establishing presence on an internal device.

There are times when you really need to see into an SSL stream, like security research or auditing. Often times that’s as easy as adding a custom SSL certificate to the machine’s root store, so the application sees your forced HTTPS proxy as legitimate. In the case of Go, applications verify certificates independently of the OS, making this inspection much more difficult. The solution? Just patch the program to turn on the InsecureSkipVerify feature. The folks at Cyberark have dialed in this procedure, and even have a handy Python script for ease of use. Neat!

Speaking of tools, we were just made aware of EMBA, the EMBedded Analyzer. That’s an Open Source tool to take a look into firmware images, automatically extract useful data.

Breaking BSOD

Just as we were wrapping this week’s column, a rash of Windows Blue Screens of Death, BSODs, starting hitting various businesses around the world. The initial report suggests that it’s a Crowdstrike update gone wrong, and Crowdstrike seems to be investigating. It’s reported that renaming the C:\windows\system32\drivers\crowdstrike folder from within safe mode will get machines booting again, but note that this is not official guidance at this point.



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